From Just War to Just Intervention by Atwood, Susan J.
New England Journal of Public Policy
Volume 19 | Issue 1 Article 5
9-21-2003
From Just War to Just Intervention
Susan J. Atwood
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp
Part of the International Relations Commons, Military, War and Peace Commons, and the
Religion Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in New England Journal of
Public Policy by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Atwood, Susan J. (2003) "From Just War to Just Intervention," New England Journal of Public Policy: Vol. 19: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol19/iss1/5
55
The Just War Ethic, which traces its origins back to the medieval Christianchurch, has faced many challenges regarding its relevance in different historical
eras. But until today, it has remained the touchstone for defining the just use of
force. It has done so by undergoing a number of evolutionary changes in focus, in
response to fundamental shifts in world thinking and order — the Reformation, the
birth of the nation-state, the advent of the nuclear age, to name but a few.
 In 1945, the United Nations Charter drew directly on the Just War Ethic in its
commitment to uphold world peace. But it also laid the groundwork for an expan-
sion of right cause in the latter part of the twentieth century by its commitment to
protect human rights. In that second part of the twentieth century, “states have gen-
erally sought to deal with threats to peace through containment and deterrence, by a
system based on collective security and the United Nations Charter.”1  In terms of
the Just War Ethic, the United Nations had, in the majority of cases, become the
proper authority, the arbiter of right intent and just cause.
But by the 1990s we were no longer dealing with the tidy tableau of the Cold
War, when the rules were laid down by the two superpowers; their nuclear balance
of power defined world security as well as world vulnerability. New threats to glo-
bal security began to emerge, posed by “rogue” states such as North Korea and Iraq;
“failed” states such as Somalia; emerging nuclear powers such as India and Pakistan;
and terrorists with potential access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as
the Al Qaeda network. The decade saw a number of multilateral “just” interventions
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on humanitarian grounds under UN or NATO auspices. These interventions stretched
the capacities of the UN to its limits but seemed, however tentatively, to augur a
nascent commitment to a multilateral approach to just humanitarian interventions.
The nature of the debate changed dramatically after the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001. The United States went to war, first with the Taliban government
of Afghanistan, then with Iraq, based on what it claimed to be potential threats to
national security interests. The intervention in Afghanistan was justified by the
Taliban government’s refusal to cease harboring Al Qaeda. The Iraq intervention
was justified, in part, as an effort to stop Iraq from transferring WMD to terrorists.
In other words, it was preemptive.
Is the twenty-first century to be characterized by a doctrine of preemptive wars
and interventions based on perceived threats to national interests? And, most impor-
tantly, are such interventions “just”? UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan fears that
such an approach “could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilat-
eral and lawless use of force, with or without credible justification.” 2  The nascent
post–Cold War move to expand the definition of right cause to include humanitarian
intervention within the borders of sovereign states, finds itself abruptly, if tempo-
rarily, sidelined by this more fundamental challenge to the Just War view of proper
authority, just cause, and right intent.
 In this article, I will examine the changing nature of the debate about interven-
tion through the lens of the Just War Ethic. I will examine how we have responded
to this new globalized world where the Westphalian notion of sovereignty and non-
intervention in the internal affairs of a state are, after three hundred years, being
reexamined in the light of such new threats as transnational terrorism, genocide, and
failed states.
The Just War Ethic
Over the centuries, many people with different religious and cultural beliefs have
contemplated the philosophical basis for war. In the early Middle Ages, at about A.D.
400, it was St. Augustine who first formalized the Just War Ethic within the Chris-
tian Church. Augustine believed that war was a result of sin as well as a remedy for
sin. The Christian view of love that he espoused requires at one and the same time
that man would do no harm, that man would prevent harm to others, that he would
remove the source of harm, and that he would do good to others. These different
manifestations of love may conflict, creating significant internal tension and exhor-
tations that lead in different directions. Augustine breaks this tension by saying that
killing human beings is sometimes justified. This was a profound shift away from
the pacifism of the early church. In the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas subse-
quently specified three conditions for undertaking a Just War: proper authority, right
intent, and just cause.
The emphasis throughout the Middle Ages in debating the Just War Ethic was on
jus ad bellum (just cause for war), rather than jus in bello (just conduct in war). The
“moral” arguments for a just war put forward from the Church by Augustine were
furthered by Thomas Aquinas, who justified self-defense, as it is “the nature of be-
ing to preserve one’s own life.” Augustine had explicitly discounted self-defense as
just cause. This was a huge change in the just war doctrine and one that prevailed
over time.
Beginning in the sixteenth century, the world had become a different place. The
Reformation split the Christian World in the West, and the Peace of Westphalia in
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1648 opened the era of the rise of the modern state. No longer was there one “just
authority” but many, both secular and religious. Prevailing wisdom held that it was
the right of the state to defend itself against aggression by the use of force. Three
thinkers — Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist, Francisco de Vitoria, a Spanish Dominican
priest, and Francisco Suarez, a Spanish Jesuit priest, all of whom died in the century
before 1648 — saw the need to change the focus of the debate about a just war in
order to preserve the ethic. Believing that war and politics must be constrained
within the moral order, they took the lead in moving from discussion of just cause,
jus ad bellum, to just means, jus in bello.
The concept of “simultaneous ostensible justice” was also introduced at this time
— in other words, it was held to be possible that both sides could be ostensibly con-
vinced of just cause and that there was likely some justice on each  side. This was a
move away from the medieval concept of the holy just war — the Crusades —
where Christians believed that they had just cause, right authority, and right intent
all on their side against the  “infidels”  (whether we have moved back to this mode
of thinking under the George W. Bush administration will be examined later). Now,
one Christian state might find itself at war with another in defense of its territory.
This was the period of the droit de guerre (right to war) and the emphasis was on jus
in bello, the legal means by which to prosecute  a just war. Just means included
immunity for non-combatants and proportionality in the application of force, that is,
the amount of force used must be in proportion to the problem encountered. From
this period on, the two tracks, legal and moral, coexisted with some tension and
some complementarity.
From the sixteenth to the early twentieth century, the focus was on order (that is,
peace) over justice. The thinking behind the primacy of the sovereign state was that,
in order to avoid an almost perpetual state of war, decisions about what was or was
not just had to be decided within national boundaries. This was to change in the
second half of the twentieth century, leading to the debate about just intervention in
the internal affairs of a sovereign nation-state. The change marked a shift in empha-
sis of the debate from the legalist paradigm that “states should never intervene in the
affairs of other states,” to the moral underpinnings of this concept that allowed for
exceptions to this principle.3  As Walzer argues, “humanitarian intervention is justi-
fied when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts ‘that
shock the moral conscience of mankind.’”4
The twentieth century was bloody. After World War II, the Just War Ethic came
under extreme pressure with the advent of the nuclear age. Could any war be justi-
fied if the means used were nuclear and could presage the end of mankind? Was
even nuclear deterrence moral when it threatened nuclear destruction and huge civil-
ian casualties, violating the ethic of noncombatant immunity, which was codified in
the 1929 Geneva Convention. How could nuclear war ever be proportional, that is,
limited? In this way, deterrence came to be the principal weapon for preserving
world peace.
Meanwhile, the United Nations, founded in 1945 by sovereign states to preserve
world peace (that is, order), but also to protect human rights (that is, justice), was
stymied by the Cold War mentality that prevented action in the spheres of influence
of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. But within their
respective spheres of influence the two superpowers felt free to intervene in the
internal affairs of countries, including Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan,
Grenada, and Panama. So intervention to preserve order went forward unsanctioned
by the world community. The concept of “just”  intervention — intervention to
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preserve justice and a return to the debate about just cause — was not yet on the
radar screen.
The Just Intervention Debate
St. Ambrose could be said to be the father of the doctrine of universal intervention
when he stated that “he who knows about evil but does nothing is as bad as the evil
doer.” Intervention is not new. As we have seen above, intervention was common
practice during the Cold War. Colonialism in previous centuries might be seen as a
form of long-term intervention. But the presumption of nonintervention, based on
the Westphalian notion of the primacy of sovereignty and the inviolability of
national borders (or, at least, of spheres of influence), remained the norm until the
second half of the twentieth century. The rationale for nonintervention had broad
support across a wide spectrum of ideology and belief. Its supporters included real-
ists, liberals, and anti-imperialists.
The realist case for nonintervention emphasizes the primacy of order over justice.
It draws from the Westphalian tradition of the sovereign state and noninterference
into the internal affairs of states, which, after one hundred years of religious wars,
brought order into the anarchical European world. The liberal position is somewhat
more difficult to characterize. John Stuart Mill held that at times when a community
struggles for its self-determination, the rest of the world should stay away and allow
the combatants to prove the rightness of their cause through their own efforts. Only
thus will it have validity. Other liberal thinkers, however, favor intervention to de-
fend the rights of the oppressed. The anti-imperialist school of thought holds that
the concept of justice gives carte blanche to strong and large states to dictate to the
small, weak ones. So, the principle of nonintervention serves three needs: order,
self-determination, and justice. In the period just before the Iraq war, we have seen
all these positions reexamined and, in some cases, reversed.
The second half of the twentieth century saw the beginning of a debate about just
intervention. In other words, intervention on behalf of individual rights, a humani-
tarian intervention. In examining the precepts of this debate, it is helpful to revisit
the basic philosophy of the just war tradition, which evolved over some 1600 years.
A just war requires proper authority, just cause, and right intent. Intervention, as
distinct from war, consists of engagement in the internal affairs of a state. In order
to cross this line from war to intervention, it had increasingly become accepted wis-
dom that proper authority should be multilateral, such as that of the United Nations.
Just causes for intervention in the 1990s were held to include genocide, ethnic
cleansing, and the collapse of state authority. Right intent, while remaining the
restoration of peace, has moved from the vital interest of a state to defend its own
civilian population to the national or international interest in justice for the victims
of oppression.
Other just war criteria include the principles of proportionality, last resort, and
moral possibility of success. These can also potentially guide the just intervention
debate. Clearly, if the United States had intervened in Hungary in 1956, there would
have been a risk of superpower confrontation escalating to nuclear war. Such an
intervention would not, therefore, have been proportional. Although the nuclear
threat has not disappeared (and indeed the number of countries in the nuclear club
has increased) in the post–Cold War era, there is now little likelihood of catastrophic
nuclear war between the superpowers because there is only one superpower left. But
we are still faced with the problem of where intervention is likely to occur. From
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the perspective of proportionality, interventions are less likely to occur in large
states such as China, or in the conflict in Chechnya, which would engage the Rus-
sians. Not surprisingly, therefore, the United Nations has witnessed more enthusiasm
from the developed world for opening the debate on intervention and some outright
opposition from developing countries who fear that they are the most likely targets
of such interventions.
The principle of last resort also poses a dilemma. Sometimes, intervention can
surely be more effective if it is not the last resort, thereby giving tyrants the time to
carry out genocide or launch weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, this was one of
the justifications employed by George W. Bush for the American invasion of Iraq. In
the case of intervention in a failed state, it is worth considering that failed states are
likely to be exactly those states where the vital interests of the developed world are
hard to define, and whether intelligence on local conditions is poor. Under these
circumstances, is there a moral possibility of success?
Other issues that have been hotly debated in the context of just intervention in-
clude the question of whether intervention can be both limited and impartial. This is
the question posed by Richard Betts in his article “The Delusion of Impartial Inter-
vention.”5  He argues that if intervention is limited it has to be partial unless it is to
prolong the conflict indefinitely. To be impartial and end the conflict presumes
overwhelming both sides with force. For instance, in Bosnia, the United Nations was
impartial. It is evident that its impartiality helped the stronger side, the Serbs. In
addition, the presence of impartial peacekeepers on the ground inhibited NATO
airstrikes, again helping the Serbs.
In Kosovo, by contrast, the NATO intervention was partial and limited and
brought a speedy end to ethnic cleansing. Betts argues that limited and impartial
intervention “makes sense in old-fashioned UN peacekeeping operations, where the
outsiders’ role is not to make peace, but to bless and monitor a cease-fire that all
parties have decided to accept. But it becomes a destructive misconception when
carried over to the messier realm of “peace enforcement,” where the belligerents
have yet to decide that they have nothing more to gain by fighting.” 6  The August
2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, states that impartial-
ity remained one of the bedrock principles of UN peacekeeping, but outlines
exceptions to the principle “where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incon-
trovertibly is violating its terms.” The Panel further acknowledged that “No failure
did more damage to the standing and credibility of the United Nations peacekeeping
in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.”7
Other questions concerning just intervention revolve around the type of mandate
that is contemplated. In other words, is the mandate limited to stopping the killing
after which the intervener leaves the country, or should it extend to supporting the
establishment of democratic institutions and economic and social development?
The last type of intervention has been characterized as  “nation-building” and has
come to have negative connotations, both for the developing world, which regards
this as another type of imperialism, and for military personnel, who do not regard
this as their role. George W. Bush came to the presidency pledging disdain for
nation-building. He embraced it when he began to make the case for intervention in
Afghanistan and Iraq. There may well be a case to be made for the United States
serving as the emergency response, stopping the killing and then leaving. The
postconflict work, the peace building, might be better left to other, smaller nations
and the United Nations whose motives are less likely to be interpreted as imperialist
and thus less likely to politicize the situation further. But a situation where the rich,
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developed countries provide the money for intervention and the poor, developing
countries provide the manpower, risks a further polarization of the whole concept of
intervention.
So the question remains — given the complexities mentioned above, should the
norm of nonintervention be modified and if so how? How would such a change
translate into effective policy and international law? The current discussion re-
sembles the post–World War II debate about the significance of nuclear weapons.
First came a period of schizophrenia, from 1945 to 1958, when policymakers
struggled to fit nuclear weapons into existing ideas about warfare and, at the same
time, sought to remove them from the face of the earth. It was only in the late 1950s
that a new strategy of deterrence for the nuclear age was undertaken. In the post–
Cold War era, some fourteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, policymakers
continue to struggle to determine whether the criteria of a just war still apply in the
twenty-first century, and how they might be adapted to embrace the new challenges
inherent in the concept of just intervention. If the “moral” decision is made to define
what constitutes grounds for just intervention, a new policy and legal framework is
needed. It is, however, worth noting that the Just War Ethic is the product of some
1600 years of evolutionary thought, while the just intervention debate is in its in-
fancy.
Before exploring further such a moral and legal framework for an ethic of just
intervention, I will look at selected cases of intervention in the 1990s and early
twenty-first century to examine the lessons they offer and the precedents that they
may have set.
New Rules of Engagement?
The United States, in partnership with the United Nations, had barely a year to
reflect on the challenges of the post–Cold War era before the Gulf crisis. In Septem-
ber 1990, President George H. W. Bush articulated his vision for a “new world or-
der.” President Bush stated, “Had we not responded to this first provocation with
clarity of purpose; if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination; it would
be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world.”8  This statement, made
four months before the coalition went to war against Iraq, was followed, two weeks
after the outbreak of the conflict, by another. Bush declared, “America was the only
nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace.”9  Following the victory
over Iraq, President Bush also alluded to the role of the United Nations in the new
world order, “the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill
the historic vision of its founders.”
It is ironic that the first attempt to define a role for the United States in the
post—Cold War era was, in fact, precipitated by a conflict that had all the elements
of a traditional war in a prenuclear age, rather than an intervention. Iraq’s aggres-
sion against a sovereign country, Kuwait, occasioned the conflict. The Alliance, led
by the United States, in choosing to end the war after expelling Iraqi forces from
Kuwait and not taking the war to Baghdad, consciously sought to adhere to the tra-
ditional doctrine of a just war (respect for national boundaries) ethic rather than
entering the still undefined territory of just intervention. President Bush’s “new
world order” was, in fact, a return to the vision of Woodrow Wilson, albeit under
very different circumstances. Both visions foresaw:
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• the guarantee of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity
• ensuring the safety of democratic societies by a universal
system of collective security against the threat of arbitrary
power
• a leadership role for the United States10
The real challenges in dealing with a new era characterized initially by interven-
tion and then again by war, were to fall to the next two U.S. administrations. And
these challenges were very different in nature. President Clinton was confronted in
short order by crises in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo. The U.S.
response to these various crises was slow and painful and took place broadly within
the framework of a debate on multilateral just intervention on humanitarian
grounds. President George W. Bush, on the other hand, confronted by a direct act of
aggression on U.S. soil, took immediate action, initially with UN approval, against
Afghanistan and, subsequently, undertook a preemptive, unilateralist approach to
war against Iraq. The rationale for the Iraq war was a curious mixture of just cause,
posited in terms of defense of vital interests (that is,  security against weapons of
mass destruction) and right intent, in terms of the humanitarian suffering of the
Iraqi people. Above all, it highlighted the tension surrounding the issue of last resort
— can a preemptive war be just? Is it “just” if evidence is subsequently found that
“justifies” the intervention and therefore, to the contrary, if no evidence is
forthcoming?
Judging Theory Against Reality:
Intervention in the 1990s
To President Clinton, inaugurated in January 1993, fell the task of actively defining
the role of the United States in the post–Cold War era. The Gulf War that had inau-
gurated the new era did not presage the challenges that were to follow and this
allowed the first Bush administration, while referring to a “new world order” to, in
fact, conduct business very much as usual on its watch. The Gulf War was a tradi-
tional war, with a clear aggressor (Iraq) against a sovereign state (Kuwait), albeit the
most high-tech one in history. U.S. casualties had been minimal, popular and con-
gressional support high, and there was a sense that the United States had finally shed
the burden of Vietnam.
Samuel Berger, Clinton’s National Security Advisor, writes in Foreign Affairs, in
late 2000: “Like no president before him, Bill Clinton has dedicated the power and
passion of his presidency to peacemaking. Like most other presidents, he has had to
contend with those who say America should do nothing about foreign conflict unless
we are directly threatened. . . . We have worked for peace because we believe in
defusing conflicts before, not after, they escalate and harm our vital interests.” His
choice of the phrasing “vital interests” as distinct from national or international is
interesting. Vital interests are usually defined as being those that directly threaten the
security of the country and the safety of its civilian population. It is questionable
whether intervention in a failed state, such as Somalia, would meet the traditional
definition of vital interests.
Somalia
Somalia was the Clinton administration’s immediate inheritance from the first Bush
administration. The first UN peacekeeping forces, United Nations Operation in
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Somalia (UNOSOM I), arrived in Somalia in April 1992 in response to the collapse
of civilian authority that had seen hundreds of thousands of Somalis dying of
starvation and disease and fighting between rival clans. As the humanitarian crisis
worsened, President Bush in December 1992 after his defeat at the polls announced
the intention of the United States to deploy 28,000 U.S. troops as part of what was
to become a 37,000-strong, U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF).11  Bush stated,
“Our mission is humanitarian, but we will not tolerate armed gangs ripping off their
own people, condemning them to death by starvation.” The seeds of confusion were
already apparent in that statement and implied that, despite the humanitarian nature
of the intervention, the United States would inevitably become involved in Somali
politics.
For the United Nations, Resolution 794 of December 3, 1992, establishing
UNITAF to implement humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, broke new
ground. “This was the first time that an unambiguously internal and humanitarian
crisis had been designated as a threat to international peace and security, thus justify-
ing peace-enforcement measures.”12
Somalia was to have a decisive impact on the just intervention debate for the
wrong reasons — it was ultimately an unmitigated disaster. The death of eighteen
U.S. soldiers in late 1993 led to the Clinton administration’s decision to withdraw
troops by March 1994, accompanied by all European troops. The UN forces with-
drew completely by March 1995.
This experience tempered the approaches of both the United States and the UN
toward humanitarian intervention. The immediate loser was Rwanda where some
800,000 people died as a result of genocide that began in April 1994 when the inter-
national community was still licking its wounds from Somalia and failed to inter-
vene: “In Bosnia, UN peacekeepers under fire from or taken prisoner by Serb forces
over the last two years were expected to turn the other cheek for fear of ‘crossing
the Mogadishu line,’” (that is, abandoning neutrality and becoming involved in a
civil war).13
But the lessons supposedly learned from Somalia, a failed state, where a success-
ful intervention could never have been short-term, did not necessarily apply to the
very different cases of Rwanda, where a rapid end to genocide would have been the
rationale for just intervention, nor apply to Bosnia in the throes of a civil war, where
ethnic cleansing in the heart of Europe made the case for just intervention on hu-
manitarian grounds.
The retrospective lessons from Somalia, laid out by Clarke and Herbst in 1996,
provide a much more constructive blueprint:
This much is manifest: no massive intervention in a failed state — even one for humani-
tarian purposes — can be assuredly short by plan, politically neutral in execution, or
wisely parsimonious in providing “nation-building” development aid. Nations do not
descend into anarchy overnight, so intervenors should expect neither the reconciliation
of the combatants nor the reconstruction of civil societies and national economies to be
swift. There is an inescapable reciprocity between civil and military goals. Military
commanders cannot expect a failed state to become inherently peaceful and stable and
their efforts to be worthwhile in the long run without the work of developmental and
civil affairs experts. Likewise, humanitarian workers must recognize that the relief
goods they handle in failed states can become the currency of warlords.14
By the time of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in November 1995, which
brought an end to the four-year agony of Bosnia, the lesson had been learned that an
intervention characterized by impartiality and limited in scope cannot suffice when a
63
country has been devastated by civil war. But it came at a high price for the people
of Bosnia. And it was of no help whatsoever to the 800,000 who perished in the
Rwandan genocide between April and July 1994.
Rwanda
The roots of the Rwandan tragedy in the 1990s can be found in the 1959–63 explo-
sion of violence between the two rival groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis. In the late
1980s, Tutsi refugees in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which
attacked the Hutu regime in Rwanda in 1990. After three years of conflict the
Arusha Agreement was signed in August 1993. But the assassination of the president
of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, October 1993, sparked mass killings first of
Tutsis and then, in retaliation, Hutus. The subsequent deaths of President Juvenal
Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi when their
plane crashed on April 6, 1994, was used as a pretext by Hutu extremists to seize
power and to attack all Tutsis and Hutu moderates.
Although it is arguable that the speed of the genocide, with the majority of the
killings being carried out between April 3 and 20, 1994, would have rendered any
intervention too little and too late, the lesson lies in the failure of foresight and pre-
ventive diplomacy. “US intelligence agencies committed virtually no in-country
resources to what was considered a tiny state in a region of little strategic value.
During the genocide’s early stages, the US government actually received most of its
information from non-governmental organizations.”15
Other issues, raised by Romeo A. Dallaire, the Canadian commander of the UN
forces on the ground, are the moral possibility of success and the role of non-major
powers in intervention. He writes: “Yet a central, moral question remains unan-
swered: did the ineffectiveness of the UN mission in grasping the situation and poor
handling of the political, humanitarian, and military response in extremis abet the
genocide?” He answers in the affirmative. He goes on to say, “This gap between the
intensely complex and desperately critical situation and the inadequacy of the re-
sources provided to deal with it, raises a profound question of moral pragmatism. If
the intervention comes to a point where it has little or no chance of being effective,
should it have been withdrawn (or some might say undertaken) in the first place?”
Dallaire also reflects on the question of major power involvement:
The US involvement in and around Rwanda presents a paradox that does not suit a
global power. In my mind, it remains evident that even though US soldiers and field
commanders were more than willing to do much more, they were ordered to stay out,
avoid casualties and smile for the cameras. Of course, domestic politics have a direct
influence on foreign policy, but when spin doctors slow and enfeeble relief efforts of the
big powers well below the minimum of support required to stop the enormous suffering
at hand, I believe we should look more closely at what middle powers and third world
nations, which also had to balance moral assessments of support against risks of casual-
ties, can ultimately do. Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Ghana, India, Ethiopia,
and Tunisia all put their efforts inside Rwanda . . . right on the front line where they
were needed most. These nations, some desperately poor, shamed the world by doing
the right thing. So, do we pursue these middle powers to deploy up front and keep the
world’s first powers in reserve, in support of the operations? I believe this option merits
serious study and review.16
So, by 1994, with Bosnia two years into its tragic war, the Clinton administration
and the UN were already reeling from two ill-fated interventions in Africa.
Although the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had been
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heavily engaged in coordinating the UN humanitarian response to the refugee crisis
in the former Yugoslav republics since November 1991, nothing that had gone
before predisposed the UN or the United States to look with optimism on supple-
menting humanitarian intervention by military intervention in Bosnia.
Indeed, the decade of the 1990s that had opened with such high hopes for peace
and prosperity in the post–Cold War era was no longer looking so bright. “In the
1995 edition of Agenda for Peace, the fundamental policy document on UN peace-
keeping, Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali expressed less optimism about the
possibilities for intervention than in the 1992 edition, largely because of the United
Nations’s searing experience in Somalia.”17  It would be left to his successor, Kofi
Annan, to examine the legacy of the UN’s peacekeeping role in the Brahimi report,
issued in August 2000.
Bosnia
Bosnia was not a failed state (it was a brand-new one) such as Somalia; genocide
was not being perpetrated as in Rwanda. Bosnia was an example of a civil war be-
tween the three major ethnic groups with outside aggression from Catholic Croatia
and Orthodox Serbia. This outside aggression could have offered the international
community the “just” option of intervening. But impartial intervention would have
had to be massive to be effective, and, therefore, unpopular in public opinion,
whereas intervention on behalf of one side was not necessarily supported by member
countries of the European Union.
International reaction, therefore, was one of paralysis in the face of the unfolding
crisis. This translated into a commitment to humanitarian assistance but little else.
François Fouinat, Coordinator of the UNHCR Task Force for the Former Yugoslavia
(deployed in November 1991), stated in October 1993, “it is not simply that the
UN’s humanitarian efforts have become politicized; it is rather that we have been
transformed into the only manifestation of political will.”18  UNHCR itself came
under severe criticism for allegedly facilitating ethnic cleansing by evacuating vul-
nerable civilian populations. High Commissioner Ogata described the predicament as
follows: “In the context of a conflict which has as its very objective the displace-
ment of people, we find ourselves confronted with a major dilemma. To what extent
do we persuade people to remain where they are, when that could well jeopardize
their lives and liberties? On the other hand, if we help them to move, do we not
become an accomplice to ‘ethnic cleansing’?”19
The paralysis of the international community had several root causes. First, the
United States, despite a growing debate about multilateral intervention, was still
hostage to baggage from the Vietnam war and held to two central premises: that a
government had ultimately to be able to survive without external support and that
casualties had to be kept to a minimum. Too many elements of the Bosnian conflict
resembled the quagmire of Vietnam with its guerilla-type warfare and complex in-
ternal politics.
 Profound difficulties arose as a result of deep-seated differences between the
United States and the EU on interpretation of the root causes of the crisis and how
to resolve it: “The US tended to see Serb aggression at the root of the conflict, while
the Europeans (with the exception of Germany) tended to distribute blame more
equally. The Europeans, therefore, approached the task more as mediators than as
partisans. The Europeans were more inclined to believe that a solution would have
to involve some form of separation while the Americans believed that a united,
multiethnic Bosnia was not only desirable but also attainable.”20  The Dayton Peace
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Accord of December 1995 marked the final reluctant acceptance by the US that, at
least in the short term; Bosnia would be divided along ethnic lines. Dayton did,
however, provide for assistance for the “right of return.” Ironically, Dayton differed
remarkably little in its lines of partition from an earlier peace plan put forward in
February 1992 by the Europeans that provided for Bosnia to become a confederation
of three states.
During the 1992 U.S. presidential election campaign, Democratic Party candidate
“Bill Clinton conveying a sense of moral outrage at Serb actions and atrocities, was
calling for a more interventionist US approach.”21  Once elected, however, the
Clinton administration “expressed great concern for the Muslims’ plight, yet it was
equally adamant (as the Bush administration) in ruling out a combat role for US
ground forces and was ambivalent even about helping to oversee the implementation
of any peace accord.”22  However, the new Administration immediately took a more
active role in the negotiating process with the EU and the UN and later joined with
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia to form the “Contact Group” in
April 1994.
Bosnia highlighted the differences between the United States and its European
allies and underlined the absence of any clear definition of the principles for “just
intervention.” Although the United States was rhetorically more inclined to intervene
militarily in favor of the Muslims and against the Serbs, in practice it was not pre-
pared to commit ground troops to that end. The EU, inclined to seek a peace accord
based on ethnic partition and to deal in an even-handed way with the three parties,
had peacekeepers on the ground and was opposed to airstrikes that would jeopardize
their safety. The UN meanwhile had been handed a mandate of peacekeeping that
implied its neutrality. This ultimately contributed to strengthening the strongest
aggressor, the Bosnian Serbs.
The West at Dayton elevated President Slobodan Milosevic to the status of peace-
maker. His popularity at home was undiminished. To the great disillusionment of the
Albanian population in Kosovo, a province of Serbia, the Dayton Accord made no
attempt to deal with its status. The human rights abuses against Kosovo’s Albanian
majority population by the Serbs had long been seen as the potential flashpoint for
conflict in Europe. The groundwork was in place for the evolution of the next crisis
in Europe.
Kosovo
The crisis in Kosovo was hardly a surprise. Since 1989, when the province’s autono-
mous status within Serbia was revoked, Balkans experts had been predicting that
Kosovo would be the tinderbox for another war in Europe.
In February 1998, clashes intensified between the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) and the Serbian security forces. The violence caused large numbers of
Kosovars to flee to Albania and Montenegro, provoking a large-scale refugee crisis
that threatened the fragile stability of those newly democratic governments.
Peace talks convened in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999 but when these
collapsed, NATO launched a 78-day bombing attack on Kosovo and Serbia, as a
“last resort.” This action was taken  without authorization from the UN Security
Council where Russian and Chinese vetoes were anticipated. The NATO decision
itself was hard fought and had provoked serious tensions within the Alliance. “Even
though by autumn 1998, all NATO nations agreed that there was a moral and politi-
cal imperative to act, the members of the Alliance could not easily and unanimously
find a legal ground for military action against Serbia. Six countries at least —
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Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain — had political and legal mis-
givings reflecting the unfinished state of international law concerning humanitarian
intervention (using force).”23
Immediately prior to the NATO decision to begin its bombing campaign, the
Russian Ambassador to the UN, Sergei Lavrov, asserted that to invoke “a humanitar-
ian crisis in a country as a sufficient reason for unilateral intervention” would be
“unacceptable and contrary to the foundations of the contemporary system of
international relations and to the Charter of the United Nations.”24  Once the bomb-
ing campaign started, Chinese officials condemned the operation in even stronger
terms and “warned of serious consequences if the bombing did not stop.”25  Western
concepts about the evolution of the right of humanitarian intervention were, it
appeared, by no means universal.
Kosovo was not a failed state; it was not a state at all. Aggression was being
perpetrated by the government of the country on some of its (Albanian) citizens.
Kosovo was the clearest example to date of the multilateral undertaking of just inter-
vention in a sovereign state. Intervention in Kosovo was not impartial because there
were none of the doubts that accompanied the issue of intervention in Bosnia con-
cerning which side was the aggressor.
The NATO air campaign caused an initial escalation of violence on the ground as
Milosevic appeared intent on wrapping up his campaign of ethnic cleansing. Thou-
sands of Kosovar Albanians were killed and some 800,000 fled or were expelled
from Kosovo after the start of the air campaign.26  The NATO bombing was also
responsible for the deaths of some refugees and of Serbian civilians in Belgrade and
other major cities in Serbia proper, thus raising serious questions about noncomba-
tant immunity and proportionality.
Was Kosovo an exception or would it set a precedent for just intervention? As the
Clinton administration reached the end of its term, the next administration, under
George W. Bush, seemed uninterested in grappling with the issue of just cause and
just means with which to carry out interventions. In fact, it had publicly eschewed
“nation building” during the election campaign and stated that it would begin to
withdraw U.S. troops from Bosnia and Kosovo, a statement that it later recanted.
An Old Reality Revisited?
Iraq
Both the moral and legal framework for just intervention had been shown to be
lacking in the 1990s, resulting in a number of interventions that lacked consistency
in either the ways or means. Despite this, these interventions had some common
features, in terms of proper authority (multilateral), just cause (humanitarian) and
right intent (relief of suffering). The lessons they offered had been examined by the
international community and the precedents they set have underlined the need to
update and expand the evolving body of international law concerning humanitarian
intervention. But in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attack on the World
Trade Center, focus moved sharply away from humanitarian intervention and back
to the more familiar territory of war.
Although the subject was more familiar, the players were different. The aggressor
in this conflict was not a state, but non-state actors with access to the type of re-
sources and intelligence that traditionally had been out of their reach. The initial
outpouring of sympathy and support for the United States from most of the world
67
community reflected both the shock and the recognition that all states were poten-
tially vulnerable to this type of attack. The rules of the game had been radically
changed and the nature of the debates that followed reflected the disorientation of
the major state players.
The Bush administration warned the Taliban government of Afghanistan that it
should stop harboring Al Qaeda operatives. When it became clear that the Taliban
would not oblige, the administration lost little time in going to war in Afghanistan.
Although the United States took the lead itself, it enjoyed wide support both from
UN member states and the U.S. public. By early 2003, Iraq had become the focus
for the administration’s concern. Saddam was deemed an “imminent” threat to U.S.
vital security interests on the basis that he possessed the weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The administration intimated that there was a strong connection between
Saddam and the Al Qaeda network, the implication being that he could provide
terrorists with WMD for use against the United States.
The administration initially worked through the UN Security Council, and Reso-
lution 1441 was passed, bringing UN weapons inspectors back to Iraq. Despite their
failure to locate any WMD and their requests for more time, the United States de-
cided to take military action. When the UN declined to follow the United States
lead, the administration, supported primarily by Britain, proceeded to take preemp-
tive-action and went to war, without UN proper authority.
The Bush administration cited the imminent threat to its vital national security
interests as the main rationale for going to war with Iraq. It asserted the need to
strike preemptively before Saddam Hussein could further develop and deploy
WMD. But in an effort to depict the war in humanitarian terms that would be more
palatable to a wider audience, it also made reference to rescuing the Iraqi people
from oppression. Meanwhile, North Korea — another member of the Bush “axis of
evil” — a country that was demonstrably closer to developing WMD than Iraq while
continuing its domestic policy of oppression, was subjected to nothing more menac-
ing than ongoing multilateral diplomacy. These two widely differing approaches led
to inevitable speculation about the administration’s hidden agenda, both by the
American public and by the international community.
The administration floundered in its rhetoric, even as it moved decisively toward
war. Terms such as “crusade” and “regime change” surfaced and then disappeared
from the administration’s official statements, but the harm was done. While some in
the Bush administration saw Iraq as the first step toward creating a peaceful and
democratic Middle East, other outside commentators speculated that for George W.
Bush the real incentive was simply to get rid of Saddam Hussein, the man who had
eluded and made attempts on his father’s life.
 The lack of one clearly stated and credible rationale for war with Iraq greatly
damaged the international and national credibility of the Bush administration. It also
provoked enormous strains with U.S. allies within the UN, particularly in Europe.
The debate came to be less about the threat posed by Saddam and more about dis-
trust of U.S. intentions.
 Was the Iraq war a just war? In terms of proper authority, despite the UN’s lack
of sanction, the United States as a sovereign state has the right to defend itself from
outside aggression, if such aggression actually was manifest. The cause would have
been just if it was the destruction of WMD that could threaten the vital security
interests of the United States — the problem was that no hard evidence was or has
yet been found to support that claim.
As to right intent, the juxtaposition of so many conflicting reasons for war served
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only to raise doubts as to intent. In terms of proportionality of means, although
civilians were not explicitly targeted, there were many civilian casualties; however
the conduct of the war adhered to post–World War II norms for noncombatant im-
munity. The war itself could be judged proportional (that is, among other things, not
likely to provoke wider conflict) if viewed as an attack on a small, rogue state by
the U.S. superpower. But if the war against Iraq comes to be seen as a war by Chris-
tians against Muslims, a twenty-first century crusade, it risks igniting the “Clash of
Civilizations” predicted by Samuel Huntington. Seen in these terms, it does not meet
the criteria of proportionality any more than did a U.S. intervention into Hungary in
1956. In addition, the war in Iraq appears to have distracted resources and attention
from the fight against terrorism, as well as created new recruits for Al Qaeda. And
far from offering hope for a wider Middle East peace, the war in Iraq threatens to
further destabilize the region and to turn Iraq itself into a gathering point for terror-
ists. Certainly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has only worsened in its aftermath.
There was a moral possibility, if not certainty, of military success. But in terms of
the postconflict situation, there is no clarity of goals or timelines. The many differ-
ent and conflicting reasons given for going to war have made it unclear what type of
intervention the war in Iraq constitutes. Without benchmarks, it is impossible to
judge success.
The Iraq war was not a war of last resort; it was a war of choice, not necessity.
The conflict was also a radical departure from the “just” interventions of the 1990s.
It bears more resemblance to the type of interventions carried out during the Cold
War era by both superpowers into countries within their own spheres of influence to
effect regime change or to restore order. In this sense, the Iraq war does not fit into
the evolving framework for just intervention. It remains to be seen if the rest of the
twenty-first century will follow the Iraq pattern with “coalitions of the willing,”  led
by the United States, becoming the norm, or whether we will revert to multilateral
just interventions under UN or other auspices. The current and growing unpopular-
ity of the Iraqi occupation among the U.S. public may well determine the direction
as, indeed, may the 2004 American presidential elections.
Lessons Learned From Interventions
in the 1990s and in Iraq
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in reviewing the record of intervention in the
1990s, has expressed the hope that two cases, those of Rwanda and Kosovo, are
never repeated. The first case he characterizes as a moral failure on the part of the
international community and the second as a legal failure, when the UN was simply
bypassed and the air campaign launched without UN authorization. In the 1990s
“expectations and assignments given to the United Nations outran its capacity for
effective action”.27  The Brahimi report 28 was intended to review the record of the
1990s in the areas of peacekeeping and security and to make practical recommenda-
tions for the future.
In looking back on the decade, the panel stated:
as the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no
amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible
force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed. But force alone cannot create
peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built. Moreover the changes
that the Panel recommends will have no lasting impact unless Member States summon
the political will to support the United Nations politically, financially, and operationally
to enable the United Nations to be truly credible as a force for peace.29
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Increasingly in the 1990s, the United Nations found itself deploying into situa-
tions where the warring parties had not signed a peace accord, or where a peace
accord, such as the Arusha Agreement in Rwanda, had broken down. The UN,
therefore, found itself in situations of ongoing conflict. Although the Brahimi Panel
concurred that the “consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in
self-defense should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping,” it went on to
acknowledge that experience had shown that the norms of impartiality and self-
defense should be subject to exceptions. Thus, it should be understood that “where
one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms,
continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case
result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil.”30
In addition, the panel recommends that the UN should be authorized to stop vio-
lence against civilians in defense of the principle of noncombatant immunity. But
the Panel stresses that those UN missions charged with civilian protection should be
given the appropriate resources with which to effectively carry out their mission –
the moral possibility of success. This, most glaringly, was not the case in Srebrenica,
Bosnia, where UN peacekeepers stood helplessly by while Bosnian Serb forces mas-
sacred Muslim civilians under UN protection in a designated “safe area.”
The panel makes a comprehensive list of recommendations to the UN. These
focus on strengthening the UNs:
• intelligence gathering capacity
• ability to deploy more rapidly by creating standby multinational
brigades and oncall lists of military officers, civilian police,
international judicial experts, penal experts, and human rights
specialists
• cooperation across military and civilian sectors through the
creation of  “Integrated Mission Task Forces”
• the capacity of UN headquarters to plan and support peace
operations.
In commissioning this report, Annan showed courage and foresight. He recog-
nized that the United Nations has become, de facto if not yet de jure, the primary
institution charged, by its member states, with carrying out multilateral intervention,
but that the record to date is a sorry one. In order for the UN to have the “moral
possibility of success” in any future interventions, the lessons learned from the mis-
takes of the 1990s must be absorbed and measures taken to correct them.
Implementation of the panel’s recommendations necessitates political will from
its member states but also flexibility and creativity from UN bureaucrats. If success-
ful, they will go a long way toward ensuring that interventions in the twenty-first
century will benefit from a more coherent approach than those of the last decade.
With enhanced planning, integration, means, and coherence of mandate, the UN may
finally be in a position to carry out the vision of its founders. In conclusion, the
panel called on the leaders of the world assembled at the Millennium Summit, “to
commit . . . to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to fully accomplish the
mission which is, indeed, its very raison d’etre: to help communities engulfed in
strife and to maintain or restore peace.”31
The Brahimi report was drafted to look at the hard lessons learned from the mul-
tilateral interventions of the 1990s. Kofi Annan recognizes, however, that if the
United Nations is to remain relevant in the new debate about the just use of force, it
needs to continue to reform its structure and practices. Therefore, three years after
the Millennium Summit, Kofi Annan called on the Security Council to “begin a
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discussion on the criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to address
certain types of threats  — for instance, terrorist groups armed with weapons of
mass destruction.”32  He spoke of his intention to create a new panel that would deal
with the following four tasks:
 First, to examine current challenges to peace and security;
 Second, to consider the contribution which collective action can
   make in addressing these challenges;
 Third, to review the functioning of the major organs of the
      United Nations and the relationship between them; and
 Fourth, to recommend ways of strengthening the United Nations,
  through reform of its institutions and processes.
International Humanitarian Law
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is clear that there is as yet no new
paradigm for “pro-democratic” or humanitarian intervention. Neither the moral nor
legal framework fits the new reality. “International law governing the right of hu-
manitarian intervention is incomplete. International practice has evolved swiftly
during the 1990s. Yet the incipient political and moral consensus that intervention is
sometimes necessary to prevent human rights violation on a major scale has not been
formalized into a set of rules of international law. It is now urgent that this consen-
sus should be transformed into international law.”33
In the last decade, the moral practice of intervention has outstripped the current
state of international humanitarian law. This must be addressed forthwith lest it lead
to murderous delays or even be used as an excuse for indefinitely delaying interven-
tion. The extreme confusion and different interpretations of the legal grounds for
intervention surrounding the conflict in Kosovo are the most obvious example.
China and Russia, as we have seen, accused the NATO members of violating the UN
Charter, which requires Security Council authorization for intervention. The West
Europeans, meanwhile, were equally conflicted. NATO Secretary General Javier
Solana justified the action by arguing that the use of force was the only way “to
prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian
population of Kosovo.”34  This was a moral rather than legal argument and echoes
Michael Walzer who, a prophet before his time, wrote in 1977, “Any state capable
of stopping the slaughter has a right, at least, to try to do so. The legalist paradigm
indeed rules out such efforts, but that only suggests that the paradigm, unrevised,
cannot account for the moral realities of military intervention.” 35
The two bodies of law that are directly relevant in the debate on intervention are
international human rights law and humanitarian law. The first of these is an off-
shoot of the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights and deals with violations by states,
and the second, which evolves from the older tradition of jus in bello, deals with
violations by individuals. These two bodies of laws have increasingly overlapped as
international tribunals on Former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) and the
International Criminal Court (1998) have been created in recent years. “But what is
also common to international human-rights law and humanitarian law is that how-
ever sophisticated they are becoming in laying out sanctions, they are silent on
preventive measures. Yet, it is precisely the prevention of massive human rights
violations or humanitarian catastrophes that has become the basis of ‘humanitarian
intervention’ practices in recent years. These practices have not yet been codified
into law. The only certainty about them is that, increasingly, they give primacy to
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human rights over the sovereignty of states when the two principles conflict.”36
As precedent is set in practice concerning just intervention within sovereign bor-
ders, international law is likely to follow. “The law evolves as practices become
acceptable to most states in the international community.”37  Kosovo might therefore
serve as a precedent rather than as an exception. One difficulty with using this pre-
cedent to establish universal practice is that Kosovo could be argued to be subject to
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) human rights
principles that “allow states to interfere with one another’s affairs well beyond what
general international law permits.”38  It may be that Europe, through the OSCE,
should take the lead in developing specific rules for humanitarian intervention with
the hope that the rest of the world will follow.
Where To Now?
In light of the lessons learned over the past decade, how should we construct a new
just intervention ethic for the twenty-first century? The departure point should be to
preserve nonintervention as the norm; intervention should be the exception that
proves the rule. The Westphalian concept of state sovereignty did have some moral
content in its goal of preserving order, in other words, peace. It also recognized that
the first duty of a head of state is to his or her own people. Hence the definition of
vital interests as being those that relate directly to the security of the civilians of
one’s own state.
But in today’s globalized world, conflict inside state borders now has the poten-
tial to threaten regional or international security with a speed and intensity that was
unthinkable in the Westphalian age. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, the
international community, for the first time in fifty years, has the chance to focus on
issues of justice within states’ borders and to reopen the discussion of just cause, as
distinct from just means, that dominated the last four centuries. Vital interests retain
their primacy but consideration of national and international interests now can and
should be added to the equation. There must be consideration of contemporary
causes that may override the presumption of nonintervention. In the 1990s, just
cause for intervention included, in practice, genocide, failed states, and ethnic
cleansing. Whereas it may be tempting to add to this list, it is a temptation that
should be resisted.
In 2003, the Bush administration undertook intervention to prevent a state from
developing WMD that, if employed, would threaten U.S. vital interests. An impor-
tant line has been crossed here. A distinction should be drawn between the intent to
use and the actual use which is qualitatively different — in other words, in nuclear
terms, no first strike should be the rule for intervention. But such a distinction
should not be applied to terrorist groups that may also acquire such weapons. Ter-
rorist groups do not acquire WMD as a bargaining chip or to defend their own
people, they acquire them with the express intent to use them against civilians of
states that they seek to destroy. The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan to root out the
terrorists who had, in this case, already attacked American civilians on American
soil, and the regime that sheltered them, was thus in a completely different category
than its intervention in Iraq.
Another cause that some would like to see added to the list is abuse of human
rights that falls short of genocide or ethnic cleansing, but to cross that line is to open
a Pandora’s Box. What country in the world do others at some point not see as
committing human rights abuses? Such an approach also risks widening the
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philosophical divide between the West and the developing world that would likely
be the target of most interventions of this type.
Diplomacy, including selectively applied sanctions, should remain the tool of
choice in issues of prevention — in terms of dissuading states from acquiring WMD
as well as in seeking to avert internal conflict. As we have seen, the intelligence-
gathering capacities of the United States and the UN should be strengthened, par-
ticularly in regions that have traditionally not been those of geo-strategic interest.
Force should truly remain the last resort in terms of ending the aggression of
whatever nature, otherwise the line become too easy to cross.
Interventions in the 1990s differed most notably from those of previous eras in
their designation of proper authority. Multilateral intervention became the norm. A
key building block for a new ethic of just intervention should be its multilateral
nature. This would lessen fears that the United States or other major powers are
acting in a hegemonic fashion and would give more credibility to claims of right
intent. In the Cold War, the UN had a limited role. Now it has the chance to be the
lead agency in the just intervention debate, but it must first resolve the paradox
inherent in its own structure. Founded by sovereign states, it is also the home of the
Charter of Human Rights. How does the UN balance these dual pressures? Secretary
General Kofi Annan has expressed the view that two crises of the 1990s must not be
repeated. First, the failure to intervene in Rwanda (a direct consequence of the
debacle in Somalia) and prevent mass genocide was a moral failure. Second, the
decision to bypass the UN in the Kosovo intervention was a legal failure. Now the
U.S. intervention in Iraq threatens to undermine the United Nations Charter and the
Just War Ethic itself.
A preference for a multilateral approach, however, need not necessarily restrict
the designation of proper authority to the UN. There may well be a case for recog-
nizing that in certain circumstances when, as in the case of Kosovo, the Security
Council threatens to veto intervention for political reasons, despite obvious just
cause, NATO could be the designated authority. In other situations, the European
defense force, should it materialize, might be the appropriate authority. The Euro-
pean defense initiative may also spur other regions such as Africa, Latin America,
and Asia to examine the possible security role of their own regional associations,
such as Organization of African Unity — as in Liberia; the Organization of Ameri-
can States, and the Association of South East Asian Nations. Such a role might be
defined in terms of intervention to preserve peace in their own neighborhoods,
preferably still under a UN mandate to avoid fears of the emergence of regional
hegemons and, where appropriate, with U.S. involvement. This would lessen the
direct burden on both the UN and the United States.
The debate at the UN about lessons learned in the 1990s should go a long way to
addressing the issue of moral possibility of success. With a more coherent mandate
and increased means, the question posed by Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda about
whether it would have been better under the circumstances for the UN never to have
deployed at all will, we hope, not have to be posed in future UN interventions.
Although the end of the Cold War and the consequent decreased likelihood of
intervention provoking a nuclear response eased temporarily  the justification of the
principle of proportionality, the potential advent of terrorists acquiring WMD and of
the danger of a Muslim-Christian global war should serve to keep this question at
the forefront of any debate about just intervention.
The 1990s presented the international community with new challenges  — in
Kofi Annan’s phrase, “problems without passports” — that required a serious review
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of the existing framework for the just use of force. In facing up to the hard lessons
learned over the past decade, the dawning of the twenty-first century, despite the
war in Iraq, holds out hope for the evolution of an ethic of just intervention, based
on its much older counterpart, the Just War Ethic. The challenge of this next, global
century is to improve the implementation of humanitarian interventions and to de-
fine their mandate, as well as to clarify international human rights law. At a moment
in history when, increasingly, even local conflicts have global implications, aban-
doning the pursuit of justice within or across state borders in an attempt to recapture
an illusion of order, is not an option. z 39
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